Much is known about the importance of dynamic capabilities. Yet
INTRODUCTION
The concept of dynamic capability-defined as "the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base" (Helfat et al., 2007: 4) -is central to the field of strategic management (Helfat, 1997; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007) . The reason is that dynamic capabilities can enable firms to profitably enter new product (Gilbert, 2006; King and Tucci, 2002) and geographic markets (Bingham and Eisenhardt,2006; Kale and Singh, 2007) , and foster innovation (Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007) . Further, scholars suggest that dynamic capabilities promote economically significant change not only in more dynamic environments and in new ventures, but also in less dynamic environments and in large established firms (Helfat and Winter, 2011) .
Given the importance of dynamic capabilities, much research focuses on how they might be learned (Dosi et al., 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007) . Empirical work in this stream focuses on one dynamic capability in particular such as an acquisition (Capron, Anand, and Mitchell, 2007; Heimeriks, Schijven, and Gates, 2012) , alliance (Dyer and Kale, 2007; Schreiner, Kale, and Corsten, 2009 ), country entry (Bingham et al., 2007) , or divestiture (Brauer, 2006; Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007) capability. Yet, while understanding how a particular dynamic capability develops in isolation is important, such an isolationist view offers little insight into the links among dynamic capabilities. To the extent that firms build multiple dynamic capabilities over time, there will likely be overlap between the firm members and learning activities involved. Missing from the literature, therefore, is an empirically grounded understanding of how learning one dynamic capability might influence the learning of others and, in turn, what implications this has for the firm. We address this gap.
We explore whether and how dynamic capabilities are learned concurrently. Consistent with existing research (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011) , we define "learning" as being an observable change in behavior based on experience. 1 Given the state of extant theory, we rely primarily on theory-building and theory-elaboration methods (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Lee, 1999; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) . The empirical setting is the development of acquisition, joint venture (JV), and divestiture capabilities within Dow Chemical, the world's largest producer of plastics and the world's second largest chemical company. We show that concurrent learning of dynamic capabilities is aided by three activities: "initiating structure," "generalizing structure," and "backward-chaining structure." Concurrent learning begins as firms form a dedicated group to codify knowledge. That emerging structure is idiosyncratic to one phase (e.g., implementation) of one process (e.g., acquisition) but then is quickly leveraged into multiple processes (e.g., JV and divestiture) and further elaborated in a reverse chronological way to address additional phases (e.g., transaction and due diligence). Overall, besides setting forth an emergent theoretical framework that develops the concept of "concurrent learning," we contribute by adding insights about effective growth and distributed practice and by shedding light on the nature of experience transfer.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Dynamic capabilities enable firms to modify their resource position. They include those that pertain to doing acquisitions, product development, country entry, alliances, and divestitures (e.g., Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; King and Tucci, 2002; Helfat and Peteraf, 2009; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011) . These activities foster significant change (Helftat and Winter, 2011) and so are less tied to operational capabilities that allow firms to sustain current actions and make a living in the present. 2 Although the existing literature does not address how different dynamic capabilities might be learned concurrently, it does suggest how a particular dynamic capability can be learned. One way is via the accumulation of experience. Experience provides individuals with information that can help them better understand the causal linkages between actions and outcomes (Zollo and Winter, 2002) . More experience with JVs, for example, should allow managers to gain an understanding of how to select new partners, manage contract negotiations, and terminate agreements (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Sampson, 2005) . The logic, therefore, is that skill and capacity build through practice (Argote, 1999) .
The timing of experience also appears to influence the learning of dynamic capabilities. Scholars argue that too much new knowledge, as well as too little, inhibits effective learning (Hayward, 2002) . The rhythm of experience may thus regulate its benefits (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Gersick, 1994; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002) . To illustrate, Hayward (2002) used data on 535 publicly disclosed acquisitions and found that the benefits from acquisitions depend on their pacing. Hayward argued that acquiring firms learn less from their experience when that experience is accumulated in a rapid sequence of acquisitions. Instead, firms were more likely to learn how to perform acquisitions when executives paced their acquisition experience and had 6-to 12-month time intervals between their acquisitions.
The similarity of experience may likewise impact the way firms learn dynamic capabilities. For example, Zollo, Reuer, and Singh (2002) studied 145 alliances in the biotechnology industry and found that alliance experience with the same partner appeared to be important to learning an alliance capability. The creation of new alliance agreements with prior alliance partners seemed to allow firms the opportunity to exploit prior learning and avoid additional relationship-specific investments in incentive alignment, monitoring, and formal controls. Likewise, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) analyzed data from 449 large acquisitions and found a positive relationship between acquisition similarity and acquisition performance. The more similar the focal target's industry was to those of the firm's prior targets (measured by four-digit SIC code), the better the focal acquisition performed (as measured by abnormal stock returns).
Research also suggests that the codification of experience impacts the learning of dynamic capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002) . Codification is defined as the written documentation of knowledge in tools such as manuals and rule books (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004) . Codification helps capture the tacit knowledge embedded in individuals' experiences about how to manage key activities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002) . The exercise of reflecting on past actions to create a tool for the execution of a particular task can improve understanding of cause-and-effect relationships. For example, using a sample of 228 acquisitions, Zollo and Singh (2004) found that codification of acquisition experience into detailed rule books and manuals for each phase of an acquisition led to higher-performing focal acquisitions (as measured by improvement of return on assets post-acquisition). Similarly, using a sample of 78 firms with alliance experience, Kale and Singh (2007) found that knowledge codification positively influences alliance performance (as measured by abnormal stock returns). The authors argue that codification helps firms build and exploit alliance know-how and thus develop the capacity to extend and modify its resource base via alliances.
Overall, theoretical and empirical studies suggest that dynamic capabilities are learned from experience, and that similar, paced, and codified experience is particularly helpful. Yet, while this research is valuable, it focuses attention on the learning of one particular dynamic capability (e.g., an acquisition or alliance capability) and does not discuss how learning one dynamic capability might influence the learning of others. 3 From a theoretical perspective, understanding the potential for concurrent learning of dynamic capabilities is important because this would help provide deeper insight into learning, knowledge, and experience transfer effects in activities of high strategic value. For example, scholars argue that acquisitions, alliances, or country entry are not just important to strategy but may actually constitute the very essence of strategy for many firms (Bingham, Eisenhardt, and Furr, 2007) . From a managerial perspective, learning how to develop multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently is important as using several capabilities together generates more shareholder value than emphasizing one in particular (Dranikoff, Koller, and Schneider, 2002) . As one illustration, Shi and Prescott (2011) discovered that firms using both acquisitions and alliances to drive corporate development outperformed other firms who relied only on acquisitions. In summary, the literature lacks an in-depth, longitudinal study that explores whether firms learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently and how that learning might take place.
METHODS
To gain in-depth understanding of how firms learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently, we rely on the extended case method. This method uses an in-depth historical analysis of a single firm to reconceptualize, build, and extend theory (Burawoy, 1998; Danneels, 2010) . 4 The extended case method thus involves constant cycling between theory and data to help provide novel accounts of found that alliance experience improves the performance of a focal acquisition when that acquisition is managed in ways that resemble the typical handling of an alliance. However, results from this large-scale empirical study suggest that firms might learn to manage alliances before they learn to manage acquisitions. Thus, it does not explicitly examine whether alliance and acquisition capabilities might be learned together and, if so, how. It also leaves unaddressed several other critical research questions, such as whether experience spillover effects are symmetric in both directions and whether, if at all, divestitures-often seen as the mirror image of acquisitions-might also influence alliance and acquisition outcomes. 4 Examples of the extended case study in the organizational literature include Burgelman's (1994) study of Intel's successful movement from memory chips to microprocessors, Tripsas and Gavetti's (2000) study of how Polaroid's history hampered its ability to adapt to digital photography, Siggelkow's (2002) study of the gradual evolution of strategy in the mutual fund giant Vanguard, and Danneels' (2010) study of how Smith Corona, a leading manufacturer of typewriters, altered its resource base in response to technological shifts in its industry. organizational behavior over a protracted period of time. In our study, we focus on the development of acquisition, joint venture (JV), and divestiture capabilities within Dow Chemical Corporation over multiple years.
Dow was founded in 1897, when chemist Herbert Henry Dow used electrochemistry to convert the brine underneath Midland, Michigan, into bromine. The bromine was then used to form bleach that could be sold commercially. The firm began its own sales department in 1904 and started building up its agricultural chemical business. By the 1990s, Dow had built up a successful portfolio of chemistries and advanced agro-science materials that were sold in products and solutions to customers in more than 150 countries and sectors spanning from agriculture to electronics, water, and energy. Yet, while the chemicals industry as a whole had enjoyed rapid growth for almost 50 years, by the turn of the century the industry faced a series of environmental challenges. Traditional chemical companies such as Dow faced changes in feedstock availability and price, rising energy costs, and demand shifts from North America, Europe, and Japan to Asian countries (Heimeriks and Gates, 2010) . Moreover, global demand for basic chemicals (e.g., polymers and petrochemicals used for rubber and plastics products) was stable, though margins decreased due to maturing products and consolidation. Instead, specialty chemicals (e.g., industrial gases and adhesives for coatings and industrial cleaning products) were becoming more attractive as they contained higher-margin products for a rapidly growing range of end markets. Leading chemical companies (e.g., BASF, Bayer, Dupont, and Dow) therefore began to gradually shift their portfolio from predominantly lower-margin basic to higher-margin specialty chemicals. For instance, Bayer gradually divested its oil and gas related units, while Dupont moved away from producing petrochemical products. Likewise, Dow discontinued producing chemicals for the pharmaceutical industry and started reducing its exposure to basic petrochemicals. Dow Chemical lends itself well to a case study of dynamic capability development for several reasons. First, key decision makers involved in the formalization of acquisition, JV, and divestiture activity were present in the firm at the time of data collection. On average, these individuals had almost 30 years of experience working with Dow and could therefore provide an accurate and rich, in-depth perspective on acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures from the time the firm started enacting efforts to become more effective in doing them. Second, the chemical industry in which Dow operates is attractive for this study because of the need to acquire, partner, and divest over time in order to grow and survive (Dow Annual Reports, 2010 -2012 . Third, because Dow archived its documents for managing acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, we have a historical trail of what was created as well as when and how it was to be used. As such, data for each process can be isolated, enabling single and multi-process analysis. Fourth, Dow had entered into at least a hundred acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures at the time of data collection, which ensures sufficient experience with which to examine how the firm has been purposefully modifying its resource base over time. Finally, as Dow is a publicly traded organization, financial statements, stock market return data, and press releases are available to help us analyze how well the capabilities perform (Table 1) .
We rely on three data sources: (1) quantitative and qualitative data from semi-structured interviews with company leaders; (2) quantitative data from company and public sources on Dow's acquisition, JV, and divestiture performance; and (3) archival data including company intranet documents, business publications, and other materials produced by the firm. A primary data source was the semi-structured interviews with informants directly responsible for corporate development (see Table 2 (Jick, 1979) . For example, we spent several days on site and were given access to several hundred pages of process-related documents created by Dow executives. These documents frequently took the form of Power Point presentations or manuals that detailed the overall flow of activity across a particular process (e.g., acquisition) as well as the more granular action steps associated with a particular phase of a process (e.g., due diligence or implementation). Together, supplementing interview data with archival data and relying on very knowledgeable informants (with an average of 30 years of experience at Dow) helps mitigate informant bias. We also attempted to mitigate informant bias by combining both real-time and retrospective data; i.e., Dow not only had a Our analysis involved looking for the emergence of similar themes and relationships related to learning across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1994) . From the emerging patterns, we formed tentative theoretical constructs. We then refined them by revisiting the data to compare and verify the occurrence of specific learning mechanisms. Given the literature's focus on learning from more and similar experience, pacing of experience, and codification, we examined the data for these constructs. However, we also looked for unexpected constructs, thus combining theory elaboration and theory generation (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Lee, 1999 ) in our analysis. We then iterated between theory, data, and extant research until a strong match appeared between the data and our theoretical framework (see Figures 1 and 2 ).
CONCURRENT LEARNING OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
Our data show that Dow learned acquisition, JV, and divestiture capabilities concurrently. This rich history of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, but was also engaged in numerous new acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures at the time of data collection. Such a combination is attractive because the retrospective data enables efficient data collection of more observations (thus enabling better grounding), whereas real-time data collection allows for further in-depth insight into learning (Leonard-Barton, 1990 organizational-level learning is taking place as indicated by changes in behavior (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011) as it relates to Dow's Program Management Office (to be discussed) and the activities they are engaged in. We first describe how Dow learned acquisition, JV, and divestiture capabilities concurrently. We then discuss how well these capabilities perform.
Initiating structure
Research suggests that knowledge codification helps in developing dynamic capabilities (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Zollo and Winter, 2002) . But, this work provides little understanding of how such codification comes to exist since empirical research only assesses whether codified knowledge (e.g., manuals or checklists) exists. Our study contributes by suggesting that the nature and order of codification is consequential for dynamic capability development. We find that Dow executives began the concurrent learning of multiple dynamic capabilities by "initiating structure." Initiating structure emerged from our data and is defined as the formation of a dedicated corporate group that begins knowledge codification. Hence, our definition of structure is consistent with others who define it broadly as constraint on action (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009 ).
6 Figure 2 and Table 3 show how initiating structure occurred from 1999 to 2002 and involves (1) creating a dedicated group and initial codified templates, (2) making the templates more granular, and then (3) continually updating the templates.
Creating a dedicated group and initial codified templates
Dow created a dedicated group to begin knowledge codification in 1999 as it began the integration of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)-the company's (and industry's) largest acquisition up to that point in time. 7 The group was called the Program don't have a clue, but we talked to some consultants and they said we need one.'" "I brought in a finance person because I knew that one of the things that we were going to need to try to keep track of is cost synergies. I brought in a manufacturing and operations person. I also brought in a computer person because we knew that we'd need to set up Web sites, we need to be able to share information-special file servers, etc." Begin codification for acquisition implementation "There was just a lot of knowledge all over the place, but it was never in any central repository … Nobody knew what was going on." "We didn't have any documentation prior to UCC. Before 1999, we managed more case by case; find whoever you can find and participate. We did not have a standard methodology around implementation." Continually updating the templates
Coaching by PMO "The business leader obviously knew the business, knew the business strategy, knew why they were doing the acquisition from a strategic standpoint. But, in general, that business leader probably had never done an acquisition … This is where the PMO coach or the PMO leader came in to play. He or she was the expert regarding the tools, the templates, the methodology." After-action reviews "What we did when we were done with the transaction was have an after-action review … We'd review what worked and what did not work. Then, we would take that learning and infuse that into our methodology, infuse that into the tools and templates so that the methodology and the templates we had were basically evergreen. We didn't want them to get stagnant. We wanted to constantly improve on those tools."
Management Office (PMO One of the first codified documents the PMO created for managing acquisitions detailed team structures. In the fall of 1999, Rich and his group outlined the different teams that would be involved in the Union Carbide acquisition implementation. One was cross-functional teams that would work together to ensure a smooth integration of the acquired company. 9 He said, "We put together a very good team structure at the very beginning of Union Carbide and that served us well and was the model that we used as we moved forward whether it was JVs, divestitures, or additional acquisitions" (RC).
Other codified tools were created soon thereafter. The PMO produced documentation for "on-boarding." This provided instruction for integrating acquired employees. The PMO also produced documentation that specified timelines in the acquisition process. Rich recalled, "We needed an overall roadmap to try to guide the firm. You could just envision there were thousands and thousands of different tasks that needed to be accomplished to fully integrate Carbide into Dow. And so that was the reason for putting together this high-level timeline." (RC). Finally, because the Union Carbide deal was tied to the promise of synergies, the PMO put together tools to help measure synergies along the way. Regarding these 9 As an example of cross-functional teams, consider the case of getting a new ID badge for acquired employees. The ID badge has a number on it (the employee number), which is obtained from human resources. But then for the ID badges to work properly, they need to be linked to a company's computer systems. And public affairs is responsible for taking the photos of the individual. So, three different functions are needed: HR, IT, and public affairs. first codified tools, Rich observed, "Specifying team structure, trying to put together a good on-boarding program, setting overall timelines, and then helping with synergy estimation. Those were really the first key codified tools that we started working on" (RC).
Making initial templates more granular
After initially creating generic codified tools (e.g., team structures, overall timelines, on-boarding details), Dow then began creating more functionspecific codified tools (see codified knowledge in Initiating Structure in Figure 2 ). The PMO had originally not codified function-specific information given that the role of the PMO was to supply generic templates. Rich explained, "And as far as the reason why we didn't initially put together the detailed functional information in our plan was the fact that we had a lot of subject matter experts, and their responsibility was to put together the detailed integration plan for their specific function, whether it was R&D or manufacturing or purchasing, etc." (RC). Moreover, the functional representatives from Dow involved in acquisitions were working part-time on the acquisitions, in addition to their other corporate responsibilities, and so did not have the time and resources like the individuals within the PMO to focus exclusively on codifying knowledge. With some knowledge captured in codified documents, Rich and his PMO group began to function as coaches to business unit leaders who came to them wanting to capture an acquisition opportunity but with little or no experience doing them. 
Continually updating the templates
After Rich and his team started coaching business unit leaders, they also started performing after-action reviews. These reviews became the main means to update codified tools and methodologies. (RC) . After-action reviews occurred in a large-group format, where the PMO joined with most functional leaders to discuss actions and outcomes. After-action reviews also occurred via one-on-one reviews with key functional leaders like human resources, finance, safety, or manufacturing since "the success or failure of the acquisition is so dependent upon those specific functions."
How initiating structure contributes to concurrent learning
Overall, we find that initiating structure facilitates the learning of multiple dynamic capabilities. One reason is that the formation of a dedicated group (a PMO in our case) to start codification focuses attention and provides coherence and direction. Having a dedicated group synchronizes geographically dispersed and functionally diverse work groups with each other. This lowers the likelihood of confusion, fatigue, and wasted effort, and it allows organization members to regulate the tempo of their actions and allocate time and resources accordingly (Martin, 2011) . As the PMO director commented, "The reason why we formed the PMO was to make sure that we have good alignment with all of our M&A activities, functions, and with the corporate strategy" (RC). A PMO project manager added, "We clarified touch points, roles, and responsibilities" (AJ). Without a dedicated group, like the PMO, to coordinate activity, firm members may overlap in roles and thus become confused about what to do and when.
The formation of a dedicated group also saves time. The group's creation of initial codified tools speeds capability creation as it allows executives to build off the past. For example, the PMO director remarked how the timeline for acquisitions made future acquisitions more efficient: "Speed is so critical in an acquisition … So when we announced [acquisition target], we pulled that timeline off the shelf, I put the name on top, I made a couple other tweaks here and there, and we had it within 24 hours" (RC). A PMO project manager concurred, "Acquisitions follow a fairly similar path, so documenting those and being able to pull that off the shelf is helpful. That's probably the key advantage. You're not reinventing the wheel … That enables us to move a lot more quickly, a lot more efficiently, a lot more effectively than we had prior" (JP). Codification may therefore be particularly foundational to dynamic capabilities in less or moderately dynamic industries where efficiencies exist from using common action steps, since prior theoretical and empirical research suggests that less codified structures like "simple rules" or "heuristics" are foundational to dynamic capabilities in highly dynamic environments where executing common action steps becomes problematic (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011) .
Finally, the creation of a dedicated group that begins knowledge codification limits errors. The dedicated group formulates rough initial structure for how organization members should act. This reduces mistakes. As support, the PMO director stated, "Prior to 1999, we didn't have a core group. Whenever there was an M&A deal, you just grabbed whoever. So no one was really trying to focus those resources" (RC). We find that the dedicated group first creates generic (vs. function-specific) structure. In our study, initial generic structure took the form of codified tools about team structures, on-boarding detail, overall timelines, implementation milestones, and performance metrics and tracking (see the evolution of codified knowledge in Figure 2 ). These initial codified documents help facilitate the creation of capabilities, since they channel the efforts of firm members into higher-level activities that are relevant to multiple deals, not just one. Thus, while the PMO was initially formed to help manage a focal acquisition (UCC), members of the PMO quickly began to see that they were developing lessons that could apply to many future acquisitions. One PMO leader involved remembered, "We were very specifically formed to do the Carbide deal, period. Once we did that, we went to management and said, ' We have some capability here, do you want to keep us around to work on other acquisitions?' The answer came back, 'yes!'" (JP).
Generalizing structure
Research on capabilities suggests the need for maintaining a dedicated corporate function to oversee a particular process. For example, Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002) found that firms with a dedicated alliance function (a dedicated group of individuals overseeing alliances) performed better in their alliances than firms that did not have a dedicated alliance function. While our first finding on initiating structure also suggests the importance of a dedicated corporate function for developing one dynamic capability in isolation (e.g., acquisition capability) our second finding suggests the importance of transitioning dedicated corporate functions to non-dedicated ones to help firms develop multiple dynamic capabilities in parallel. In particular, we find that after Dow leaders set up a PMO (program management office) and the PMO created some codified tools for acquisition implementation (1999-2002) , the PMO then began using those same codified tools for JVs and divestitures (2003) (2004) (2005) . We label this activity "generalizing structure." Generalizing structure emerged from the data and is defined as a firm leveraging initial structure for one process (e.g., acquisition) into multiple processes (e.g., JV and divestiture) concurrently. Figure 2 and Table 4 show how generalizing structure involves (1) generalizing structure developed for one process into multiple processes. and (2) strengthening communication.
Generalizing structure developed for one process into multiple processes
Through 2002, Dow's PMO focused on the implementation of acquisitions. But, in 2003, acquisition activity slowed down and corporate management asked the PMO to help codify knowledge for how to implement JVs (see Figure 2) . The PMO director recalled: "We expanded into JVs in 2003 … all of the discipline that we had developed and learned with Union Carbide, we just turned around and applied that to those JVs" (RC). Similarly, a PMO leader added that once the PMO demonstrated its value for facilitating acquisition implementations, senior executives at Dow were able to see how "leveraging that expertise" to facilitate implementation in JVs made strategic sense.
As PMO leaders began to see similarities between the implementation of acquisitions and the implementation of JVs, they also began to see the similarities between the implementation of acquisitions and the implementation of divestitures. An IT manager involved with the PMO noted the broad link among them when he said, "When we acquire, and we go through implementation, you could somewhat put those items in reverse on the divestiture side" (MP what are the areas of improvement. We then follow up with one-on-one interviews with the individuals." "I had about 100 interviews of Dow leaders who work for joint ventures … what we found is that there was a wealth of information but once we assembled it there were some gaps, there were obvious things that needed to be addressed but we didn't have anything. So that is when we said, you know what, we need to develop some tools or templates or processes to try to address those gaps. And I think all of that then pulled together and helped to say okay, with all the whole body of work, now how is that impacting us, whether we are doing a joint venture, an acquisition, or a divestiture."
would meet several times a week to put together the overall plan, and ensure everybody understood timelines and responsibilities. But, once they had their plan, cross-functional teams would meet every three or four weeks. At the end of the deal (implementation phase) the time was lengthened such that cross-functional teams only met monthly. Dow also strengthened communication through after-action reviews. To further develop their codified tools, PMO leaders started sending surveys to those involved in JVs and divestitures, and then conducting extensive one-on-one interviews with those individuals to understand survey insights and answers. These changes in behavior provide further evidence of learning. The PMO director explained: 
How generalizing structure contributes to concurrent learning
Overall, we find that generalizing structure fosters the learning of multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently. One reason is that it allows the recurrent use of knowledge. Scholars contend that acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures relate to one another, as they are alternative ways to shape firm boundaries, with divestitures and JVs being ways of contracting them, and acquisitions and JVs being ways of expanding them (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) . Plus, one can be the flip side of another; an acquisition for one firm often represents a divestiture for another. Given links among JVs, acquisitions, and divestitures, PMO managers felt that lessons gained in acquisition implementation were generalizable beyond acquisitions. One stated, "We understood that there would be some commonality in the other processes, namely JVs and divestitures, but it took us a while to build that experience" (JP). Similarly, the PMO director said, "We took a lot of the documents, the templates that we had used with Union Carbide (acquisition), and then modified those for JVs and likewise for divestitures" (RC). This role of the PMO in making modifications not only provides evidence of learning (via changes in behavior) but also suggests that while codified knowledge is helpful for effective experience transfer, it alone may be insufficient.
More broadly, generalizing structure improves the learning of multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently because it helps executives create expertise across multiple areas concurrently. Keeping constant the PMO members while changing the deal type facilitates learning as PMO members can readily identify similarities and differences across projects. This increases opportunities for positive experience transfer (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999 Finally, generalizing structure allows for concurrent learning because it maintains momentum in the development of dynamic capabilities. Since practice with one process is often relatively sporadic (e.g., low rate of acquisitions), taking codified knowledge for implementation in one process (e.g., acquisitions) and testing it out in related processes (e.g., JVs and divestitures) speeds the accumulation of experience and allows leaders to quickly understand the usefulness of initial codified tools. A PMO project manager stated, "We did take
advantage if there were downtimes relative to acquisitions to focus on codifying and documenting our processes and taking what we began to learn from acquisitions and apply that as we started to do JVs" (JP). Likewise, another PMO project manager corroborated, "Greenfield JVs, where you start from nothing and you build something, was not something that the group really had targeted for, but when asked, they just stepped into that space. And so I think you take whatever opportunity early on that you have to fill voids that the business would have, to see how the methodology could apply in ways that really you hadn't contemplated but works pretty well" (AJ).

Backward-chaining structure
Empirical work suggests that capabilities are likely to be developed as leaders codify knowledge for each phase of a corporate development process-i.e., the transaction phase, the due diligence phase, and the implementation phase (Kale and Singh, 2007; Zollo and Singh, 2004) . But, this work is silent on the order in which phases are codified and why that order may be important for capability development. Our work suggests that learning multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently is facilitated when firms codify phases in reverse chronological order, not in chronological order as might be implicitly assumed. We term this activity "backward-chaining structure." Backward-chaining structure emerged from the data and is defined as starting codification with the last phase and then working back to the first phase. We find that the PMO started codifying documents for the implementation phase of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures. This focused attention on the phase that is often considered the most critical and most complex, but that is also associated with many mistakes (Graebner, 2002) . The PMO then codified the due diligence phase for acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures-the phase before implementation. Finally, the PMO codified the transaction phase for acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures-the phase before due diligence and the first phase chronologically. Figure 2 and Table 5 detail this finding and show how backward-chaining structure involves (1) sequencing codification based on importance and complexity as well as unmet firm needs, and (2) enhancing knowledge transfer via coaching and cross-fertilization.
Sequencing codification based on importance, complexity, and unmet organizational needs
Several studies identify the implementation phase of acquisitions as the most complex and critical phase influencing acquisition performance (Heimeriks, Schijven, & Gates, 2012; Larson & Finkelstein, 1999) . 10 Likewise, we find that before 2006, Dow's top management saw implementation as the key phase of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures and so focused exclusively on codifying knowledge for this phase. The PMO director noted, "Our role is to make business unit heads successful. It's really about the understanding and the vision as far as how are you going to implement something."
In 2006, the PMO group began to see a need for its expertise outside of the implementation phase. Leaders noticed that the due diligence phase in acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures lacked process discipline. Said the PMO director, "And the person in charge of the deal would say, 'Well, I guess we have to do a due diligence. Who do we need?' And it was not coordinated. They had no idea who to even contact. There was no process discipline, they didn't have a checklist, they didn't train people … They had never done a due diligence. In fact, they 10 For example, the implementation phase for a large acquisition involves coordinating hundreds of professionals and touches every operational aspect of the company, while the transaction phase involves as few people as possible (it is confidential), and touches hardly any operational aspect of the company. Just as the PMO group began to see how implementation tools created for acquisitions were relevant to JVs and divestitures, so they began to see how due diligence tools, such as corporate and function-specific due diligence checklists and value assessment documents, had relevance for all three deal types. Given their credibility and experience, the PMO offered to oversee the due diligence phase, rather than just the implementation phase, for acquisitions, JVs, and divestments. This proposed action met little resistance within Dow because it not only exploited the knowledge base of the PMO but also addressed a critical need. The PMO director said, "Frankly, it was such a pain for our business and corporate leaders to put together a due diligence team that they welcomed anybody who was willing to help them pull together those groups of individuals" (RC). The director added, "We said, ' Program management office role expands based on unmet needs "And the person in charge of the deal would say, 'Well, I guess we have to do a due diligence. Who do we need?' And it was not coordinated. They had no idea who to even contact. There was no process discipline, they didn't have a checklist, they didn't train people … They had never done a due diligence. In fact, they couldn't even spell due diligence." "Frankly, it was such a pain for our business and corporate leaders to put together a due diligence team that they welcomed anybody who was willing to help them pull together those groups of individuals." "What we found also was that there was a tremendous turnover of people in the transaction phase … So there was really a lack of process discipline." Codification occurs in phases, starting with the most critical and complex phase and then moving backward "Phasewise, we first developed our expertise in implementation. And then, we … became the leaders of the due diligence phase of acquisition, JV, divestiture. And now we support the transaction phase." "We used our implementation expertise across the three types of transactions (acquisition, joint venture, divestiture). And then we saw a place for ourselves in the due diligence phase." "We were just focusing on the implementation of the acquisitions. Then we segued into joint ventures … And then, we went into the divestitures, and then all along here we started saying: 'You know what, not only can our group help with the implementation but why don't you let us drive and lead the due diligence effort.' So we do the due diligence for the acquisitions, we do due diligence for JVs, we assemble all the information for due diligence on divestitures. And then more and more we're spending time working with the transaction teams." Enhancing knowledge transfer through coaching and cross-fertilization
couldn't even spell due diligence" (RC
PMO coaching of business units continues to evolve to provide additional help to functional leaders within business units (and not just business unit
heads) "I am in a coaching and counseling mode for IS managers as they go through the steps of the methodology … That communication is one way how we are constantly reinforcing the use of the methodology." "They (HR functional leaders in a business unit) have got a project, and they've got a coach assigned to them, and you work it together. As the PMO gained competence and credibility for handling both the implementation and due diligence phases of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, it saw an opportunity to further extend its role into the transaction phase-the phase preceding the due diligence phase and one that also had unmet firm needs. Part of the value of having the PMO assist with and create codified tools for the transaction phase (in addition to tools for the implementation and due diligence phases) came from the high level of turnover in the people working in the transaction phase, which made capturing lessons from the past difficult. The PMO director recollected, "There was a tremendous turnover of people in the transaction phase. You'd have the corporate director of M&A who's responsible for the transaction. He or she will only be there for two years and then move on to another job and then they would bring somebody else then who had never had any experience. So there was really a lack of process discipline" (RC). Further, the personnel in charge of the transaction phase at Dow seemed to place less emphasis on capturing knowledge. Instead, they appeared to be more concerned with timely execution. The PMO director remembered, "The finance guys don't have a really good appreciation of some of the operations issues that we run into. They're not as process oriented. They worry about doing the deal and then they move on to the next, whereas our group is a lot more into trying to capture the knowledge" (RC).
Because of the PMO's reputation, the PMO was able to help Dow address an unmet need in the transaction phase. Hence, in 2007, after codifying tools for the implementation phase and the due diligence phase, the PMO started to codify tools for the transaction phase. The PMO director said, "We started to codify some of the things that our transaction people were doing" (RC). Another PMO leader added, "We talk about acquisitions, JVs, divestitures, and we talk about phases of each-transaction phase, due diligence phase, and implementation phase. So each type has all three of those phases. Phasewise, we first developed our expertise in implementation. Then, we were 'moving upstream. ' We became leaders of the due diligence phase of acquisition, JV, divestiture. Now we support the transaction phase" (JP).
These tools included a transaction proposal, a business support document, a negotiations template, board approval guidelines, and documents detailing how to perform a post-process review (see codified knowledge under Transaction tools in Figure 2) . A PMO manager involved elaborated, "Our focus was acquisitions first, and we were just focusing on the implementation of the acquisitions. Then we segued into JVs … then, we went into divestitures, and then we started saying: 'Not only can our group help with the implementation but why don't you let us drive and lead the due diligence effort?' So we do the due diligence for acquisitions, we do due diligence for JVs, we assemble all the information for due diligence on divestitures. Then more and more we're spending time working with the transaction teams 11 " (JP).
Enhancing knowledge transfer through coaching and cross-fertilization
As the PMO gained experience across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures and across deal phases (implementation, due diligence, and transaction), it gained expertise managing any type and facet of those deals. This increased the PMO's ability to transfer knowledge across the firm. One way this occurred was through improved coaching of business unit leaders and functional leaders who lacked experience in acquisitions, JVs, or divestitures. An information systems (IS) functional leader recounted:
" Another PMO project manager supported this view. She detailed her ongoing coaching with 11 Backward-chaining structure assumes a reverse chronological pattern. Dow also started from the most important phase (implementation) and then worked backwards. Likewise, Dow moved from the most complex phase (i.e., implementation phase where the PMO had more operational issues and people to coordinate) to the least complex (i.e., transaction phase where there are fewer operational issues and people to coordinate). While these patterns appeared to coincide for Dow, future research is needed to understand if backward-chaining relates equally to time, importance, and complexity. Through their coaching, PMO leaders also encouraged knowledge transfer by promoting cross-functional communication within business units. This occurred in several ways. First, the PMO initiated a handover meeting from the due diligence team to the implementation team. Here, all of the insights from each of the functions in the due diligence phase are communicated. Second, the PMO made sure that functional people who are handing over due diligence information to the implementation team did not disappear but rather remained on the steering team for the implementation project and involved in consulting for another 3-12 months to ensure a smooth implementation. The continuity of functional leaders across phases mitigated knowledge loss since Dow employees frequently moved from one assignment and team to another. A PMO IS functional leader stated this benefit when he said, "We can document as much as we can in our methodology … But losing that key person who has that experience with the deal and some of the softer points of the deal, that's a problem. So we try to keep key people in there throughout the steering team part of the implementation project. That is something that has evolved over time" (TW). Collectively, our data on the PMO's coaching provide further evidence of learning and also suggest that codified knowledge alone is inadequate for successful knowledge transfer.
Knowledge transfer also occurred through the cross-fertilization of ideas within the PMO. As PMO members were located close together and were connected through shared goals and activities, Dow's PMO appeared to meet the formal definition of a group (Edmondson, 2002) . Consequently, PMO members frequently communicated with each other to share insights as they gained experience across deal types. Importantly, this activity allowed knowledge to move from an individual level to a collective level. A second reason that backward-chaining structure helps facilitate concurrent learning is that working on documentation for common phases across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures allows leaders to better see how lessons from one process may be transferred to another. Dow's PMO director said, "Sometimes, when we're doing a divestiture, there are some things that we can learn on the acquisition side and vice versa" (RC). For example, acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures all benefited from using a "white paper document" 12 in the transaction phase. Whereas with acquisitions and JVs the white paper document specifies the motivation for resource integration, in the case of divestitures it outlines the motivation for resource de-integration. Another executive explained: "We have a white paper template … as you 're going through acquisitions, JVs, or divestitures, you're (RC) . The implication is that as groups like Dow's PMO extend their structure across different phases (e.g., transaction, due diligence, and implementation), they can better coordinate the development of dynamic capabilities concurrently because they create continuities between phases. That is, often when firms engage in acquisitions, JVs, or divestitures, the present and future become disconnected. Some executives concentrate on the transaction phase, while others focus on the due diligence phase or implementation phase. Backward-chaining brings the present and future together in orderly ways that help firms get into a cadence and create guidance for action that is both powerful and efficient. Regarding this, a senior PMO leader stated, "We're engaged in all those activities all the time. Our project managers are multi-capable with respect to managing any type of those projects" (SS). The PMO director added, "One of the beauties of having my group involved in due diligence is we're also involved with driving implementation … We've really tried to improve the linkage between transaction, due diligence, and implementation."
Performance effects of Dow's dynamic capabilities
Thus far, we have focused on how Dow created multiple dynamic capabilities in parallel. We have also avoided the tautology of equating a capability with its performance by first ascertaining the characteristics of Dow's capabilities and how they developed (i.e., initiating structure, generalizing structure, and backward-chaining structure) without assessing performance. We now assess how well Dow's dynamic capabilities perform in terms of technical and evolutionary fitness.
Technical fitness denotes "how effectively a capability performs its intended function" (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009: 97-98) . We assessed technical fitness through qualitative statements of informants (see Table 6 ). These statements emerged without prompting, as executives described the performance of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures. (RC) . Additional qualitative data suggest that Dow's dynamic capabilities are self-reinforcing as the ability to do acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures seemed to improve when done together. As the head of the PMO stated, "Dow's ability to perform acquisitions or JVs or divestitures absolutely improved by doing the other deal types" (RC). In sum, our data appear to provide evidence of technical fitness.
After assessing technical fitness, we then assessed evolutionary fitness. Evolutionary fitness denotes "how well a dynamic capability enables an organization to make a living by creating, extending, or modifying its resource base" (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009: 97-98 ; see also Helfat et al., 2007: 7) . Stock market returns are useful measures of evolutionary fitness since they reflect investor forecasts of future financial returns and so reflect how well the capabilities (are likely to) enable firms 1820 C. B. Bingham et al. 138  138  138  138  122  122  122  122  156 156 156 156 Coefficients have been multiplied by 10 3 , and tests are based on robust Huber-White standard errors. †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 to make a living from these capabilities. Accordingly, we assess evolutionary fitness through a quantitative event study (see Table 7 ). We used Thomson Financial's SDC Platinum database to look up all the acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures that Dow had engaged in between 1990 and 2010. We gathered stock market data from the CRSP database and computed the abnormal returns associated with each of these events. Finally, we used event-study methodology to assess for each acquisition, JV, and divestiture whether this performance measure tended to increase with experience, and thus whether our empirical setting exhibited evidence of a capability improving firm outcomes over time. Using event windows of three (-1,1), five (-2,2), seven (-3,3) , and nine (-4,4) days surrounding the announcement dates, we found consistent statistical patterns suggesting positive performance effects of experience in the context of acquisitions (p < 0.01), JVs (p < 0.001), and divestitures (p < 0.10). Overall, our quantitative event study provides evidence of evolutionary fitness. Together, assessments of technical and evolutionary fitness are important since they suggest that, while all of Dow's dynamic capabilities we studied (i.e., acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures) seem to perform their intended function, these capabilities also seem to enable Dow to make a living from them.
But empirical work has invariably focused on a single dynamic capability in isolation, thus overlooking how firms might learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently. We explore this gap.
Framework: concurrent learning
Our primary contribution is an emergent theoretical framework for how firms learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently (see Figures 1 and 2) . First, concurrent learning starts as firms initiate structure. Dow created a Program Management Office (PMO), a dedicated group that began knowledge codification. While existing literature also highlights the role of codified knowledge in the creation of dynamic capabilities (e.g., Zollo and Winter, 2002) , we add by showing how the order of creation appears to be consequential. The PMO first created generic documents for acquisition implementation (e.g., team structures and on-boarding detail) and then created more function-specific ones (e.g., HR strategy documents). This sequence helped the PMO generate documents relevant to future acquisitions vs. just the focal one in particular. Moreover, we find that the PMO complemented their codification with coaching to business unit and functional leaders to help them understand which codified tools to use and when. As a whole, the initial codified tools gave needed guidance and so helped Dow improve efficiency. Yet, at the same time, the PMO coaching helped the firm adjust to the idiosyncrasies of each particular event (e.g., each acquisition) and so helped Dow preserve flexibility. Together, these actions helped Dow extend its resource base by using acquisitions to strengthen its position in commodity chemicals.
Second, concurrent learning continues as firms generalize structure. Existing research finds that executives often bias activity towards one particular growth process such as acquisitions or JVs (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Folta and Miller, 2002) . By contrast, we find that Dow created more symmetry than asymmetry across acquisition, JV, and divestiture experience since PMO leaders began to see how the structure used to shape acquisition implementation could also help guide implementation in JVs and divestitures. As one member of the PMO remarked, "At a high level, acquisitions follow a fairly similar path … It also became more explicit that the other processes follow a similar path" (JP). Hence, reuse of knowledge occurred as knowledge gained from acquisition experience is not just specialized to future acquisitions. Rather, it is fungible and applicable to JVs and divestitures as well. This helped Dow modify and extend its resource base by using JVs and divestitures to carve out basic (commodity) chemicals.
Finally, concurrent learning progresses by backward-chaining structure. Leaders codified knowledge for the most critical and complex phase of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures first and codified knowledge for the least complex phase last (see Figure 2) . In our study, this occurred in reverse chronological order. PMO executives started codifying knowledge for the implementation phase of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures and then expanded their role and began codifying knowledge for the due diligence phase of each. Last, PMO executives codified knowledge for the transaction phase of each. This order helped the PMO use JVs and divestitures to exit lower margin businesses and finance deals. In sum, our framework identifies how concurrent learning of dynamic capabilities occurs (see Figure 1) . These dynamic capabilities in turn allowed Dow to purposefully modify its resource base by reducing activity in commodity chemicals and moving into specialty chemicals.
Growth and massed vs. distributed practice
Our study contributes by shedding light on how firms might more effectively grow. Extant research finds that many firms skew their growth activity towards one particular growth process, such as acquisitions (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) or JVs (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Folta and Miller, 2002) . This outcome is not surprising given that firms are prone to repeat what they know how to do (Argote, 1999) , and expanding activities too far beyond a core activity can hurt performance (Eggers, 2012) . In contrast, we find that growth may be enhanced when firms do not skew towards the use of one particular growth process, but rather use multiple ones in a balanced approach. Regarding this point, the head of Dow's PMO commented, "We have a lot of deals closed in all three areas (acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures) … We've had as much experience on each of the three; I can't say one area is more dominant than others" (RC). When a firm has some symmetry in its use of acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, it can more easily adjust and improve its "fit" with the external market. This is because the existing knowledge base of the firm restricts its growth opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . So, even though firms gain more from acquisitions by divesting excess, obsolete, or underperforming resources (Capron, Swaminathan, and Mitchell, 2001) , if executives have little experience with divestitures, their change efforts will be limited. Therefore, while dynamic capabilities help firms purposefully modify their resource base, balancing acquisition, JV, and divestiture experience gives firms more degrees of freedom for how that modification can take place.
We also contribute by providing a deeper understanding of the role of practice in the creation of dynamic capabilities. Most work on capability development implicitly advocates massed practice-i.e., repeat practice with a particular process (e.g., Danneels, 2010; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007) . With massed practice, the assumption is that executives focus on completing more repetitions with a particular process. More repetitions allow firm members time to draw inferences from the past and give them greater insight into the linkages between actions and outcomes such that firms can better leverage knowledge over time (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Helfat et al., 2007) .
Our study, alternatively, brings to light the value of distributed practice. With distributed practice, trials of one activity are broken up with periods of some other activity (Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, and Marangoni, 2003) . We find evidence of distributed practice as Dow did not simply continue to amass acquisition experience to build an acquisition capability. Rather, it interspersed acquisition experience with JV and divestiture experience. As one leader observed, "We manage acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures concurrently." Distributed practice is important because massed practice often leads to maladaptive specialization (March, 1991) . Practice with one process leads a firm to accumulate more experience with it, thus making experience with other key processes (e.g., JVs and divestitures) inadequate to make them rewarding to use (Levitt and March, 1988) . Distributed practice helps avoid maladaptive specialization and the problem of overcoming competencies firms have developed with earlier processes (Whetten, 1987) . Interspersing JV experience with acquisition experience, for example, gave executives more associations for their ideas on acquisitions (and vice versa). Other research also supports the relative benefits of distributed practice over massed practice for learning (Cornelius and Modigliani, 1985; Smith and Rothkopf, 1984) , arguing that it allows for deeper processing of action-outcome relationships (Mumford, Costanza, Baughman, Threlfall, and Fleishman, 1994) . In short, our study suggests that the benefits of practice may increase as the massed nature of that practice decreases.
Positive and negative experience transfer
Our study also contributes by providing understanding of experience transfer (Singley and Anderson, 1989; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002) . Positive transfer occurs when experience with a prior event improves performance in a subsequent event.
Negative transfer occurs when experience with a prior event weakens performance in the subsequent event. Most empirical work explores transfer effects within a given process like acquisitions (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002 (Zollo and Reuer, 2010; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) . Our study extends this prior research by suggesting that there are positive transfer effects from acquisitions to JVs and divestitures, from JVs to acquisitions and divestitures, and from divestitures to acquisitions and JVs. We also provide more granularity about how such positive transfer occurs and why. Our data reveal that Dow leaders began to see how acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures all seemed to follow three basic phases-transaction, due diligence, and implementation-and that knowledge about how one phase (e.g., implementation) worked in one process (e.g., acquisition) would generally transfer to others (e.g., divestitures). As prior research on experience transfer (e.g., Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) generally does not assume intentionality on the part of executives linking knowledge about one experience to another, an added contribution of our study is showing how positive transfer may often be inherently intentional. As one example, a PMO manager noted: "Divestitures have an element of 'internal due diligence. ' We want to ensure we understand the assets we're divesting. So, taking those due diligence principles from acquisitions you can apply due diligence on yourself, prior to divestiture. Then, when we acquire and go through implementation you could put those items in reverse on the divestiture side" (JP).
Our study also sheds light on negative experience transfer. We find that when codified knowledge is overly scripted it can lead to quasi-automatic behavior that may be inappropriate for the idiosyncrasies of a focal acquisition, JV, or divestiture. In summary, a key managerial implication is that codified knowledge alone is a necessary but insufficient condition for successful experience transfer. Some tacit knowledge residing in a stable set of generalist coaches may also be needed. Further, our data suggest that managers' use of coaches to guide the use of codified knowledge may become more important the more heterogeneous the activity (e.g., acquisitions, JVs, divestitures) since "there are no two deals that are the same." Therefore, dedicated groups (like Dow's PMO), and the knowledge that gets codified by the group, reinforce each other. Used in tandem, they help leaders effectively disseminate best practices throughout a firm.
CONCLUSION
Combining qualitative and quantitative data on acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures, we explore how firms learn multiple dynamic capabilities concurrently. Our emergent theoretical framework indicates that concurrent learning is facilitated by a corporate function (PMO) and codified knowledge that is idiosyncratic to a particular phase (transaction, due diligence, and implementation), but that is utilized across acquisitions, JVs, and divestitures and developed in a sequenced fashion. Besides shedding light on the nature of effective growth and observing the hidden relevance of distributed vs. massed practice in the building of dynamic capabilities, we contribute by expanding understanding of experience transfer. Overall, our work is a first step in addressing concurrent learning and uncovering its related activities.
